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This book appears in the series Princeton Foundations of Contemporary 
Philosophy and is partially based on the author’s seminar ‘Heresies in Logic’, 
at Princeton. The aim of this book is to provide a foundation to non-classical 
logics, i.e. extensions of or alternatives to classical logics, ‘suﬃ  cient to equip 
the reader to follow basic applications in analytic philosophy, and to tack-
le if desired more advanced works’ (p. vii). The ideas will be presented sys-
tematically and not historically. 
Philosophical logic, as the author understands this term, is ‘the part of 
logic dealing with proposed extensions of or alternatives to classical logic’ 
(p. vi) and more precisely it is ‘the part of logic dealing with what classical 
logic leaves out, or allegedly gets wrong’ (p. 1). The book starts with a pref-
ace, then continues with six chapters – the fi rst dedicated to classical logic 
and the others to a non-classical logic (temporal, modal, conditional, rele-
vantistic, intuitionistic) - and ends with some selected references and a use-
ful index of terms.  
After distinguishing philosophical logic (a technical branch of logic) from 
philosophy of logic (a philosophical refl ection on logic), chapter one provides 
the basic insights into the two big parts of classical logic : sentential logic and 
predicate logic. For each of them the author presents the language, the se-
mantics and the issue of (un)decidability, and ends by recommending –as 
for all the other chapters- further readings. 
The fi rst philosophical logic presented is the temporal one. The reason is 
that the analysis of the notions of past and future will guide ‘the treatment 
*  Constantin C. Brîncuș, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Bucharest. 
Email: c.brincus@yahoo.com.
91
 John P. Burgess, Philosophical Logic
of the more obscure notions of possibility and necessity’ (p.1). The author 
presents the language, the semantics (2.2) and the calculus of this logic (ax-
ioms 2.3, rules 2.4 and theorems 2.5). Also discussed are the axioms and the 
theorems of the temporal logic which may model the time of classical phys-
ics, and the possibility of the reduction among tenses (2.8). The chapter ends 
with a metalogical discussion regarding the soundness, completeness and 
decidability of quantifi ed temporal logic (2.9).      
   Chapter three is dedicated to modal logic and is the most extended. 
While temporal logic deals with the distinctions among was/is/will be, the 
central distinction of modal logic is that between may be (possible) and must 
be (necessary). Section 3.2 discusses the standard semantics of the modal 
language –possible worlds semantics ; Burgess prefers ‘states’ instead of 
‘worlds’- presenting Kripke models in relation with those for temporal log-
ic. As section 3.3 indicates there is not a unique taxonomy of modalities. 
However, we can distinguish among logical, dynamic (metaphysical, physi-
cal, historical), epistemic (doxastic), and deontic modalities. Before discuss-
ing the relations among modalities (3.5) in section 3.4 are presented the basic 
modal systems (K, S1, S2, S3, S4, S5). Next section (3.6) oﬀ ers a useful discus-
sion about the metalogical properties of completeness and decidability with 
a complete proof for the completeness of K. In answer to the philosophical 
question ‘which modal logic is the right one ?’ Burgess considers S4 and S5, 
and defends the latt er as being the correct answer. The chapter ends the dis-
cussion about the problem of quantifi cation with the conclusion that there 
is much to be done in this direction.
Chapter four deals with the logic of indicative (factual) and counterfactual 
(subjunctive) conditionals. The counterfactual conditionals were also neglect-
ed by classical logic because –as the author emphasizes- they do not play an 
essential role in mathematics. An extended part of the chapter is dedicated 
to the indicative conditionals –which are treated in classical logic as materi-
al conditionals (p.72). The author presents Grice’s critique to this treatment, 
the probabilistic theory of conditionals according to which the assertability 
of a conditional is defi ned in terms of the probability of the consequent giv-
en the antecedent, the remoteness theory on indicative conditionals, condi-
tional calculus and Adams test for conditionals. The discussion on the right 
logic of the indicative conditionals defends a materialist account which iden-
tifi es the truth conditions of the indicative to those of the material condition-
al. The chapter ends with a short discussion on counterfactual conditionals 
and weak conditionals.
Relevantistic logic is presented in chapter fi ve. This logic rejects the clas-
sical principle ex falso quodlibet, i.e. the principle according to which any 
statement follows from a contradiction. Giving it up implies also rejecting 
disjunction introduction, disjunctive syllogism, and the transitivity of en-
tailment. The chapter presents diﬀ erent kinds of relevantistic logic (r-logic) : 
topic logic, perfectionist logic, ‘fi rst degree’ of r-logic, dialethism, ‘purely 
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implicational’ fragment of r-logic, and ends with a discussion on the possi-
bility of combining the ‘fi rst-degree’ and ‘purely implicational’ fragments 
of r-logic.  
Chapter six presents the sentential and predicate intuitionistic logic to-
gether with their Heyting’s axiomatization, their semantics (Kripke models), 
and sketches the completeness results (in the technical sense for the sentential 
logic and in the intuitive sense for the predicate logic). The reader is also in-
formed about the recent philosophical dispute on the meaning of logical con-
stants, defi ned in truth-conditions terms in classical logic and in proof-con-
ditions terms in intuitionistic logic. 
As the book illustrates, philosophical logic is rather a technical subject and 
requires a lot of practice in order to be properly understood. Philosophical 
logic comprises ‘what logicians are doing when they are at work’ and not 
‘questions about what logicians are doing when they are at work’, what phi-
losophy of logic deals with (p. 2). The subject is presented from the more 
general concepts to the particular instances and some theorems are rigor-
ously proved. I highly recommend the book to everyone interested in logic 
and its philosophy.
